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Abstract 
 By 1942, the Japanese occupied nearly all of East and Southeast Asia and their influence 
even spread as far as British controlled India. This occupation, known as The Greater East Asia 
Co-Prosperity Sphere, was an ideological unity of Asia under the facade of mutual benefit and 
welfare of Japan and the other nations within the Sphere. However, The Greater East Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere failed because of the inability of the Japanese to form this mutual benefit 
between the nations within the Sphere. This work evaluates the events that led to The Greater 
East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, life within the Sphere, and the reasons for its failure.  
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Background & Introduction 
 The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was Japan's attempt to form an economic 
and military bloc consisting of nations within East and Southeast Asia against Western 
colonization and manipulation, but it failed because of Japan's inability to promote true mutual 
prosperity within the alliance. Japan's rise to power was quick and her early successes convinced 
the Japanese that they were the supreme race. However, along with Japan's rise to power, she 
found the West to be less than supportive. Once Japan realized the West's unwillingness to allow 
an equal footing, she began to look to expand her own empire in Asia. Japan's attempt to conquer 
Asia led to her involvement and defeat in World War II.  
 During the Tokugawa Period (1603-1867), Japan was isolated from the outside world 
through Tokugawa Iemitsu's, "Closed Country Edict of 1635." This legal document was strict 
and designed to keep outside influences at bay. The Tokugawa Bakufu felt that outside 
influences, especially the Christian faith, had tainted the purity of Japanese culture and the 
prohibition of outside influences was necessary to preserve the Japanese identity. The first two 
laws of the edict stated, "Japanese ships are strictly forbidden to leave for foreign countries," and 
"No Japanese is permitted to go abroad. If there is anyone who attempts to do so secretly, he 
must be executed. The ship so involved must be impounded and its owner arrested, and the 
3 
 
 
 
matter must be reported to the higher authority."
1
 The Edict also forbade any foreigners from 
entering Japan except for the Dutch who were confined to the port at Nagasaki due to their lack 
of desire to proselytize Christianity. Under such isolation, Japan maintained its feudal system 
and generally lived peacefully. However, in 1853, the United States thrust the outside world onto 
Japan's doorstep. 
 The United States took the American West following its war with Mexico (1846-48) 
thereby securing its Manifest Destiny; however, the United States began to look to the Pacific 
Ocean as a "new manifest destiny" by extending trade through the Pacific to East and Southeast 
Asia.
2
 United States Commodore Matthew Perry landed at Edo Bay, modern day Tokyo, on July 
8, 1853. This arrival eventually pitted Japan's samurai against the United States Navy in 
numerous skirmishes. The samurai were easily defeated because of Japan's lack of preparedness 
for modern warfare. These battles proved to the Japanese that Western military technology was 
superior to their dated methods of combat. This epiphany emphasized to the Japanese that 
modern technology was essential to national security. This realization acted as the catalyst that 
later resulted in the rise of modern Japan, imperialism, and ultimately the Greater East Asia War 
1937-1945.  
 Ongoing frustrations with the Tokugawa Bakufu combined with the realization of how 
far Japan had fallen behind in military technology led to the restoration of the Emperor Meiji to 
the head of state and the removal of the feudal system. During the Meiji Period, 1868-1912, 
Japan became interested in trade and military technology, hoping to achieve equality with the 
West in terms of respect and military power. These goals led Japan into wars with China in the 
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First Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) and Russia in The Russo-Japanese War (1904-05). Both of 
these wars ended in Japanese success, which solidified Japanese belief that Japan was the 
dominant power of Asia. While Japan continued to grow utilizing the West's model, the West 
was unwilling to allow Japan to achieve equality as a world power.  
  Since the Meiji Restoration, Japan desired to align and achieve equality with the United 
States and Great Britain. Japan believed increased trade with China to be a major factor in the 
achievement of this goal, and the way to accomplish this new relationship with China was 
through entry into World War I.
3
 Japan declared war on Germany and joined the Allied Powers 
of World War I. However, this rise of Japan eventually raised concern amongst its supposed 
allies. The U.S. and Great Britain checked Japanese growth through naval restrictions, which 
limited Japan's ability to build her military strength. In order to maintain their economic interests 
in China, the British and United States alliance enforced the "open door" foreign policy, which 
attempted to keep free trade within China giving no single nation absolute control of the 
country's goods and resources. The Japanese despised this policy, because they believed it only 
benefitted the British and Americans.
4
 These military and economic limitations alienated Japan 
to the point that she no longer desired to achieve her respect through co-operating with the U.S. 
and Great Britain. This realization eventually led the Japanese to believe that the fascist regimes 
of Germany and Italy may better complement their goals.
5
  
 The United States' Great Depression and economic recession abroad during the 1930s 
had an unprecedented negative effect on the Japanese economy. This harm convinced Japan to 
conduct her own business internally and eventually resist the Anglo-American, or British-United 
                                               
3
 W.G. Beasley, The Rise of Modern Japan (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 155.  
4
 Arita Hachirō, Contemporary Japan, vol. X, no. 1, January, 1941, in Joyce Lebra-Chapman, Japan's Greater East 
Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in World War II: Selected Readings and Documents (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University 
Press, 1975), 76. 
5
Iyenaga Saburō, Taiheiyō Sensō, in  Lebra-Chapman, Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, 166. 
5 
 
 
 
States alliance. Despite naval limitations enforced by the Western powers, Japan expanded its 
military.  Additionally, Japan emphasized the emperor's divinity through a national religion, 
Jinja Shinto or State Shinto, to establish a sense of patriotism to the nation and the emperor. 
Though technically secular by definition, State Shinto recognized the emperor's lineage to the 
sun goddess Amatersu, thus emphasizing his role as a deity, kami. These measures led to the 
birth of ultra-nationalism, a critical tool in Japan's participation in World War II. 
 Japan knew that her small geographic area and limited natural resources could not 
provide for peacetime operations, let alone sustain war against strong Western powers. In order 
to gain necessary resources, Japan needed to expand. Earlier in 1910, Japan annexed Korea to 
ensure Japanese influence in the region. The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 spread Japanese 
paranoia of Soviet communism and encouraged further Japanese expansion. Many Japanese 
believed Korea to be a "Russian dagger pointed at the heart of Japan."
6
 However, the small 
peninsula of Korea alone could not provide the resources Japan needed nor did it provide the 
desired protection from the spread of communism or defend against Soviet aggression. Japan 
looked north of Korea to Manchuria, a region full of lumber, iron, agriculture potential, and other 
resources necessary for the growth of an empire. Eventually, the rogue behavior of the Japanese 
Kwantung Army, an Imperial Japanese Army unit assigned to Manchuria with limited 
supervision from Tokyo, led to the birth of the puppet state of Manchukuo in Manchuria in 1932.  
Despite the growth of the Japanese sphere of influence, Japan, either by genuine concern 
or manipulation, began to look to the political unrest in China as an opportunity to expand into 
North China. Japanese officials began to express that the battles between the Chinese 
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Nationalists and Communists were getting too close to Manchukuo.
7
 In late 1935, Japan and 
China reached an agreement that allowed for Japanese settlement in North China. Eventually, 
Japanese interests and political tensions in North China led to the Second Sino-Japanese War in 
1937. The Second Sino-Japanese War was extraordinarily brutal. In order to rationalize the 
military abuses against the Chinese, Japan utilized diplomacy and propaganda to announce a bloc 
against the West, promising to liberate East Asia from the West. In 1938, Japan announced the 
New Order of East Asia. This bloc included Korea, Manchukuo, Inner Mongolia, and large parts 
of China. The New Order was designed to combat European influence and colonialism in East 
Asia by constructing a "New East Asia of sovereign and independent countries."
8
 The Japanese 
forced The New Order on its constituents regardless of whether they desired the new alignment 
or rejected it. This is particularly true in China, as the Second Sino-Japanese War became the 
bloodiest front of the War in the Pacific.  
 The Second Sino-Japanese War was very costly for the Japanese, so the need for different 
resources became compulsory. Japan next looked to Southeast Asia for these resources. 
However, Japan faced a problem expanding into Southeast Asia; Western colonialists already 
established governments in the region. In order for Japan to gain these resources, she had to 
initiate the war with the U.S. and European powers in the region. To accomplish this feat, Japan 
began to spread propaganda of their coming attempts to "liberate" the Asian peoples from white 
domination by air dropped pamphlets, radio broadcasts, and other means into South East Asia. In 
1940, the extension of The New Order of East Asia to Southeast Asia was coined The Greater 
East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, GEACOP, an ideological unity of Asia under Japanese 
leadership against the West. Prior to expansion, Japan assured Southeast Asians that they were 
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coming to liberate them from the Western colonists. Longing for the arrival of their liberator, 
Southeast Asians began planning for independence that they hoped Imperial Japan would grant. 
However, these Southeast Asians soon found that liberation was not truly in Japan's plans, an 
epiphany that Koreans and Chinese had already realized. Due to unwillingness on Japan's part to 
allow these nations' independence and often through sheer brutality, many under the sphere grew 
to detest the Japanese. Even today, some Asians still despise the Japanese due to their harsh 
treatment of the Asians under Japanese occupation.  
 So what was the true purpose of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere? The ideas 
of the intention of the Sphere seemed to differ amongst the Japanese leaders. It seems that many 
Japanese leaders truly did intend to spread kyōson-kyōei, coexistence and co-prosperity, 
throughout the sphere. However, the Japanese military was the face of the policy and often dealt 
with those within the Sphere with brutal measures. Dr. Ba Maw, the head of state of Burma 
during the occupation, stated the cause of the failure of the Japanese as the betrayal of the 
Japanese militarists who were "totally incapable...of understanding others," and "saw everything 
only in a Japanese perspective."
9
 Unfortunately for nationalists in Southeast Asia, the policy of 
the Co-Prosperity Sphere lacked the goal of true co-prosperity. While many argue that the failure 
of the sphere was because of short sightedness due to the war efforts, this assumption does not 
appear to be completely true. Racial motivations and the conviction of racial superiority also 
play a major role in the failure of the GEACOP. The true understanding of the intentions of the 
Sphere may never be known due to widespread destruction of government documents following 
the Japanese surrender in World War II.
10
 However, one surviving document from the Ministry 
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of Health and Welfare found in a used bookstore in the 1980s suggests that the GEACOP was 
established to manipulate other Asians into a hierarchy of nations under Japanese control, to help 
Japan achieve world leadership. 
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The New Order of East Asia 
 Japan displayed interest in Manchuria since the Meiji Restoration, but outside forces 
pushed them into action later in the 1930s. Following the First Sino-Japanese War, Russia began 
to seize much of Manchuria to protect herself from ongoing political unrest in North China due 
to China's Boxer Rebellion, 1900-1901. Russia's occupation of Manchuria led the Japanese into 
war in order to maintain her interests in the region. Japan declared war on Russia in 1904 and 
won the Russo-Japanese War the following year. After this war, Japan gained Manchuria and 
undivided influence in Korea, but due to political pressure from the West, Japan gave Manchuria 
back to China. While Japan was unable to maintain possession of Manchuria, she did keep some 
of the former Russian military bases and the South Manchurian railway.
11
 Japan achieved great 
military conquest in China and Russia during the Meiji Period, but after the Russo-Japanese War, 
Japan fell into a more peaceful role. Through the 1920s, the Japanese experienced economic 
growth and diplomatic foreign policy, but under this nonviolent surface, situations were arising 
that would lead to military expansion.  
 During World War I, Japan again hoped to increase their influence in Manchuria but she 
received opposition from the rest of the world in her attempts to realize it. One important reason 
for Japan's increased concentration on Manchuria was due to the Soviet Revolution in Russia in 
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1917. Japan feared the spread of Russian communism and hoped to increase security in 
Manchuria to prevent its spread. While the desire to have such a safety net was justifiable, 
outside pressure kept Japan from securing such a buffer. During World War I, Japan's Twenty-
One Demands of China in 1915 resulted in increased Japanese economic influence in China 
particularly in Manchuria, gave them former German bases in China, and influence into Inner 
Mongolia. Despite defeating a common enemy in World War I, Great Britain and the United 
States disapproved of Japan's Twenty-One Demands because of the added power the Demands 
gave to Japan limited the United States and Britain's control in China. The Twenty-One 
Demands marked the beginning of distrust between Japan and the Western powers. The 
Washington Conference in November 1921 enforced naval restrictions on Japan. This naval 
restriction placed a ratio of 5:5:3 between the U.S., Britain, and Japan. This restriction meant that 
for every five warships that the United States and Great Britain could have, Japan could have 
three. In addition to affecting relationships with Western powers, the 5:5:3 naval restriction also 
restricted Japan's influence in Guam, Hong Kong, and Singapore.
12
 The U.S. and Great Britain 
also enforced the "open door" policy. This policy granted trade freedom in China. The Japanese 
despised the "open door" policy because they believed it only helped the U.S. and Great Britain 
and felt the U.S. and Great Britain used the "open door" as a "convenient means of pursuing their 
sinister designs of aggression."
13
 In December 1921, The Four Powers Pact loosened the naval 
restrictions on Japan. This agreement required that Britain, France, Japan, and the United States 
consult each other in time of crisis and discouraged territorial expansion. However, the political 
damage was done; Japan had already begun to feel alienated by the U.S.-British alliance.
14
 The 
                                               
12
 Beasley, Modern Japan, 162. 
13
 Tōjō Hideki, "Address before the Assembly of Greater East-Asiatic Nations," in Lebra-Chapman, Japan's 
Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, 90. 
14
 Beasley, Modern Japan, 162. 
13 
 
 
 
5:5:3 naval restriction and the "open door" policy combined with the Great Depression of the late 
1920s through 1930s ended the Japanese hopes of gaining the respect of the Anglo-American 
alliance.  
 This disconnect is evident in the use of expositions in Colonial Korea. These expositions 
were similar to state fairs and the Japanese used them to demonstrate Japanese modernity to the 
Korean people. During the 1915 Exposition, the Japanese displayed the powers of Western 
technology to impress the Koreans and to demonstrate what Japanese colonization and Western 
technology could bring the people of Korea. As the Japanese began to feel the alienation of the 
Anglo-American alliance, Japan began to display Japanese strength and celebrated East Asian 
culture to the Koreans in the 1929 Exposition.
15
 In the 1929 Exposition, Japanese administrators 
shifted the focus from demonstrating what the West could give to Asia. Instead, they began to 
focus on the "co-prosperity between Japan and Korea."
16
 The difference between the 1915 
Exposition and the 1929 illustrate the shift from the Japanese mimicking the West to developing 
a new way to conduct themselves through independence from those they tried to mimic since the 
Meiji Restoration.  
 During the 1920s, Japanese "patriotic society" groups were growing. These groups 
believed Japan had become too "Westernized." Since the Meiji Restoration, Japan followed the 
West's lead in their methods of gaining military strength and economic growth. However, these 
societies held that following precedents set by the West had compromised Japanese virtues.
17
 
Some leaders of these "patriotic societies" planned to carry out coups to expand the Japanese 
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empire. These "patriotic societies" developed phrases such as Shōwa Ishin or Showa Restoration 
and Kōdō, the imperial way, which became vital to Japanese expansionism. These phrases 
encouraged further restoration of power to the Shōwa Emperor, commonly referred to in the 
West by his personal name Hirohito. These "patriotic societies" planted the seeds that later grew 
into ultra-nationalism. They also influenced the young and impressionable military officers who 
would later lead the Kwantung Army, a prestigious yet radically Kōdō supporting Imperial 
Japanese Army unit, to invade Manchuria in 1931.
18
 
  In addition to security concerns, one of the largest causes for Japanese expansion was 
overpopulation. During the Tokugawa Bakufu, the Japanese kept their population under control 
by enforcing a procreation law that limited the number of children per family, but during the 
Meiji Restoration, these laws were repealed.
19
 Much of Japan's land is too mountainous for 
large-scale agriculture. Due to Japan's small land mass and sprawling urban areas, food shortages 
became a problem as the Japanese were running short on arable land for agriculture. Although 
Japan's interests in Manchuria were political, Japan was also interested in her own survival. 
Manchuria is roughly three times larger than Japan and it could provide increased agricultural 
opportunities and land to occupy for Japanese immigrants.  
 Manchuria could provide Japan with much needed resources, but the political situation in 
China led Japan to worry that Manchuria could fall into Nationalist Chinese hands. In the late 
1920s, the China's Nationalist Party, the Kuomintang led by Chiang Kai-Shek, was expanding. 
By 1926, Chiang Kai-Shek's military began pushing north. The Kuomintang took Nanking in 
1927 and Peking, modern day Beijing, in 1928 defeating the forces of Manchurian warlord and 
Japanese puppet leader Chang Tso-lin. The chaotic political situation in China complicated 
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Japan's ambitions in Manchuria, so the Kwantung Army became proactive in achieving their 
goals. As the Kuomintang pushed closer to Manchuria, the Kwantung Army encouraged Chang 
Tso-lin to take refuge in Manchuria from North China following his defeat by the Kuomintang in 
North China. On 4 June 1928, disappointed in Chang Tso-lin's performance in North China, the 
Kwantung Army assassinated him on his way to back to Manchuria believing that Japan needed 
stronger leadership in Manchuria.  
 On 18 September 1931, the Kwantung Army bombed the South Manchurian railway near 
Mukden in order to make it look as though the Kuomintang attacked Japanese territory. This 
event is known today as the Manchurian Incident. The Manchurian Incident sped up Japan's 
imperial goals in Manchuria. These soldiers conducted the bombing without approval from 
Tokyo and possibly without the approval of their own commander.
20
 The Manchurian Incident 
forced Japan into action in Manchuria believing that the Chinese carried out the bombing. By 
March 1932, Japan conquered Manchuria and placed puppet leader Pu Yi, the last emperor of 
China, to be the "head of state" in the new nation of Manchukuo. The Manchurian Incident and 
the establishment of Manchukuo led to international condemnation. Rather than deal with 
judgment from the international community, Japan withdrew from the League of Nations in 
1933. Japan justified their actions not by attributing them to imperialistic opportunity, but by 
claiming that China's instability pushed them into action. Foreign Minister Uchida Yasuya wrote 
in response to China's condemnations to the League of Nations, "China is not an organized state; 
that its internal conditions and external relations are characterized by extreme confusion and 
complexity...[;]international law which govern the ordinary relations between nations are found 
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to be considerably modified...so far as China is concerned."
21
 While this justification may not 
have appeased the international community, Japanese concern over the internal conflicts of 
China, especially between the parties of Chiang Kai-Shek and Mao Zedong, was genuine and 
influenced their decision to form Manchukuo. 
 Since the 1920s, tensions between China's Nationalist Party, the Kuomintang, led by 
Chiang Kai-Shek, and the Communist Party, led by Mao Zedong, divided the nation and left it 
vulnerable to Japanese invasion. The principles of communism and capitalism directly oppose 
each other, resulting in tensions within China that led to violent disputes between the two parties. 
The Western backed Kuomintang became the official government of China and possessed the 
majority of the major cities, but the Communists continued to expand as a "grass root" 
movement particularly in the rural areas.
22
 Mao Zedong blamed the Nationalists for Japanese 
presence in Manchuria and its plans of expansion into the rest of China. He states: 
  They maintain, as they have done all along, that revolution of whatever kind is  
  worse than imperialism...Their chieftain is Chiang Kai-shek. The camps of traitors 
  are deadly enemies of the Chinese people. Japanese imperialism could not have  
  become so blatant in its aggression were it not for this pack of traitors. They are  
  the running dogs of imperialism.
23
 
 
Mao's blame of the Kuomintang is rooted in the Chinese submission to the Japanese Twenty-One 
Demands in 1915. Tensions between the Chinese Nationalists and Communists continued until 
the Chinese Revolution of 1949. The Chinese Revolution eventually brought Communism to 
mainland China and the Nationalist Party moved their republic to Taiwan.  
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 By 1932, the Kwantung Army had already begun planning expansion of Manchukuo by 
taking North China and Inner Mongolia. They hoped to gain more coal and iron from these 
regions to promote Japanese self-sufficiency. They began action by taking the Hopei and Chahar 
provinces of North China in June 1935 to "preserve peace."
24
 By late 1935, the Japanese and 
Chinese made an agreement to allow Japanese settlement in North China. The 1936 Japanese 
document "Fundamental Principles of National Policy" laid the foundation of the New Order of 
East Asia in 1938 and the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in 1940 by outlining a 
proposed relationship between Japan, Manchukuo, and China and its proposed expansion into 
Southeast Asia.
25
 The underlying theme of the document was Japan's goal of shielding East Asia 
from the Soviet Union. It states, "Our basic policies for the continent include the elimination of 
the menace of the Soviet Union by assisting in the sound development of Manchukuo and 
strengthening the Japan-Manchukuo defense setup, preparing against Great Britain and the 
United States economic development by bringing about the close cooperation of Manchukuo, 
Japan, and China."
26
 Also mentioned in the document was Japan's eventual goal of "extension of 
national influence as far as the South Seas."
27
 However ambitious the "National Policy" was, by 
the end of 1936, the Chinese Communist Party and Nationalists reached an agreement and 
aligned in a united front against Japan complicating the goals of the document.  
 In July 1937, the Second Sino-Japanese War began after a confrontation between the 
Imperial Japanese Army and the Kuomintang military at the Marco Polo Bridge near Peking, 
known today as the China Incident. After the Incident, the Japanese began their conquest of 
China and further expanded their territory in China. Despite their victories in battle and 
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expanded territory, the Japanese never gained full control of China during its Greater East Asia 
War. Fighting continued in China throughout the Greater East Asia War, which was very bloody 
and bitter. A particular example of brutality of the war was at Chiang Kai-Shek's capital at the 
incident known as The Rape of Nanking in December 1937. A reporter from the New York 
Times, F. Tillman, witnessed the event. He stated, "the Japanese Army has thrown away a rare 
opportunity to gain the respect and confidence of the Chinese inhabitants."
28
 Atrocities 
mentioned in the report include executions of surrendering Chinese troops, executions of anyone 
running in the streets, and executions of civilians suspected of being former troops. Perhaps most 
shocking of all was the fact that the Japanese troops were cheered upon their arrival into the city 
due to the Chinese hope that they would "restore peace and order."
29
 However, the Rape of 
Nanking only solidified the Chinese hatred towards the Japanese.   
 With the war continuing in China, Japanese War Minister Konoe Fumimaro officially 
declared the New Order of East Asia in December 1938. Konoe explained that the New Order 
served two main purposes: to prevent against the spread of communism and to secure natural 
resources for the war effort in China.
30
 A secondary goal of Konoe was "complete extermination 
of the anti-Japanese Kuomintang government to establish a New Order of East Asia together 
with...the Chinese who share in our ideals and aspiration."
31
 This policy was to act as a "Monroe 
Doctrine" for Asia. According to Professor Kamikawa Hikomatsu the New Order of East Asia 
tried to accomplish three points: non-colonization, non-intervention, and isolation.
32
 Kamikawa 
                                               
28
 F. Tillman, "The Nanking Massacre, 1937", New York Times, December 18, 1937, 1, 10. 
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/nanking.asp (accessed September 1, 2014).   
29
 F. Tillman, "The Nanking Massacre." 
30
Konoye Fumimaro, The Japan Times, 23 December, 1938, in Lebra-Chapman, Japan's Greater East Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere, 68. 
31
 Konoye, in Lebra-Chapman, Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in World War II, 68-69. 
32
 Kamikawa Hikomasu, Contemporary Japan, vol. VIII, no.6, in Lebra-Chapman, Japan's Greater East Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere in World War II, 26. 
19 
 
 
 
and others explained that the New Order of East Asia did not attempt to colonize nations within 
their bloc like the European model. Instead, the New Order of East Asia proposed a policy of co-
existence between nations within it. Kamikawa also explains that the New Order was restricted 
to Asia, unlike the United States who spread outside of the Americas to the Philippines. The New 
Order of East Asia attempted to form a hierarchical society of nations under Japan and included 
Korea, Manchukuo, and North China, and Formosa (Taiwan) with a goal of mutual benefit and 
sought a "spirit of universal brotherhood."
33
 Problems with the profitability of the New Order 
were quickly discovered due to the war in China's demand for resources. This demand for war 
supplies overshadowed the proposed mutual benefit of the bloc, which led to little consideration 
for long-term planning of the alignment.
34
 These problems came to be the recurring theme of the 
Imperial Japanese blocs.  
 While still struggling with the war effort in China, and convinced of a Nazi victory, Japan 
joined in the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy in September 1940 with the hopes of 
keeping the Soviet Union out of China.
35
 In June 1941, Germany attacked the Soviet Union 
without giving the Japanese warning. Japan felt the tension from the U.S. and elsewhere and 
began bracing for war. While the territory within the New Order of East Asia provided the 
Japanese with many of the resources needed for war, their current territory could not provide 
other necessary materials like oil, tungsten, and rubber. Thus, the Japanese began to look towards 
Southeast Asia, a region full of European colonial governments. However, the Japanese were 
confident they could successfully invade Southeast Asia due to European pre-occupation with 
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World War II. In August 1940, Japan announced the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and 
they soon launched their mission to bring Southeast Asia within their control.  
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The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere 
 Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, GEACOP, was an attempt to create a 
pan-Asian military, political, and economic union against oppressive white colonizers who 
occupied much of Southeast Asia. Japanese propaganda surrounding the Sphere boasted 
promises of harmony of the Asian peoples within the sphere, but reality often steered far from 
these promises. The Japanese often used brutal measures in the handling of the native peoples 
within the Sphere. While the promises of the GEACOP were probably genuine to most Japanese 
people and even some of their political leaders, much of the blame for its failures rests with the 
Japanese military men who occupied the nations within the Sphere. Racism is a critical factor for 
proper understanding of this topic. While the Japanese boasted such slogans as "Asia for the 
Asiatics" they also considered the Yamato race, the race of mainland Japan, the dominant race 
and desired to place the rest of the Asians in their "proper place" under Japanese leadership.
36
 
 Prior to Japanese expansion into Southeast Asia, nearly the entire region was subject to 
European colonization, but removing Western influence from Southeast Asia was one of the 
main goals of the GEACOP. The only exception to European dominance was Thailand, but even 
politically independent Thailand experienced Western economic pressures from France and 
Britain. However, as World War II was expanding in Europe, European governments were 
becoming less interested in their Southeast Asian colonies. The French, for example, easily 
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handed Indochina over to the Japanese without a fight.
37
 Other European nations were more 
stubborn, but as Japan would soon find out, Southeast Asia was not as profitable as hoped due to 
a lack of oil and desperate need for extensive infrastructure development. Making the situation 
even worse, wartime Japan was incredibly low on capital.
38
 Despite this lack of capital, it was 
Japanese policy that economic hardships within the Sphere "must be endured."
39
 This economic 
suffering included mainland Japan, who also endured food shortages during the war. The 
Japanese, though desperate to gain natural resources for war efforts, also desired to create an 
ideological union of Asians that differed from the European colonization model, which 
emphasized gaining capital above all. Under the GEACOP, Japan hoped to create a "spiritual 
essence" of Asian nations, which competed against the "materialistic civilization" that the West 
had built.
40
 In addition to the gaining of more resources and creating a spiritual unity of Asians, 
the Japanese hoped to "prevent the outflow to the enemy...[of] petroleum, rubber, tin, tungsten, 
[and] cinchona (a plant used for medicinal purposes)."
41
 The Japanese military was charged with 
the transportation of natural resources within the Sphere and with blocking other nations from 
gaining access to natural resources within the region. The last critical facet of the Sphere’s 
extension into East Asia was agriculture. Prior to Japan's expansion, Chinese immigrants 
dominated Southeast Asia's agricultural market. However, the Japanese aspired to send large 
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numbers of immigrants to the regions within the Sphere to engage and lead in the agriculture 
business.
42
 
 The year 1941 marked Japan's move into Southeast Asia. In July, United States and the 
Dutch enforced an oil blockade in retaliation for Japanese occupation in French Indochina. This 
blockade led to a Japanese expeditionary force to the Dutch Indies.
43
 As diplomatic pressure 
continued to rise, Premier Tōjō Hideki made his final attempt at negotiating with the United 
States on 5 November 1941. These negotiations failed and Japan launched its first strikes in 
December 1941 against U.S and British bases at Pearl Harbor and Singapore; these attacks 
signaled the beginning of the campaigns in Southeast Asia.
44
 Japan captured British Hong Kong 
by Christmas 1941, Manila by 2 January 1942, they seized Malaya on 11 January 1942, 
Singapore on 9 March, Indonesia by March 1942, Burma by the end of April 1942, and Bataan 
by May 1942. During the next three years, thousands of United States and European prisoners of 
war would be subject to hard labor, torture, and execution under Japanese occupation.
45
 Some 
Chinese immigrants also endured harsh treatment under Japanese military occupation in 
Southeast Asia. Japanese policy called to "extirpate the anti-Japanese character and...devote 
themselves to the prosperity of Greater East Asia."
46
 Chinese immigrants that full-heartedly 
supported, or at least paid lip service to, Japanese occupation were not subject to such 
punishment, but those who were loyal to the Kuomintang or the former European colonizers 
were arrested or otherwise treated harshly.  
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 Treatment under Japanese occupation within the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere 
was often brutal even to those who were not prisoners of war. Unaware of the forthcoming 
treatment from their "liberators," many native Southeast Asians longed for the Japanese arrival to 
help them gain their independence. Perhaps the best example of this situation is the Indonesians 
in the Dutch East Indies. According to a local myth, the Dutch would be driven out by a yellow 
race from the north. The local people interpreted the myth to mean the Japanese, and the 
Japanese utilized the myth as means of propaganda.
47
 Radio Tokyo sent many broadcasts to the 
native peoples of the Dutch East Indies promising liberation and promoting anti-Dutch feelings. 
The Dutch government in the region began to ban everything relating to the Japanese, including 
Radio Tokyo. The Dutch also arrested many Japanese immigrants and posted surveillance on 
anyone with close relationships with any Japanese people.
48
  
 The Japanese were successful in creating an anti-Dutch sentiment in the region, but they 
also spurred a nationalist movement that hoped they would gain independence upon Japanese 
arrival. As the Japanese arrived, they were greeted with cries of "banzai!" and little mercy for the 
former Dutch leaders was given. According to one report, "The natives must have no sympathy 
for the Dutch. They had tyrannized and exploited the Indonesian people. The Indonesians should 
help the Japanese to murder the Dutch."
49
 Another group that was subject to brutality by the 
native Indonesians was the Chinese immigrants. The Chinese were particularly despised by some 
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Indonesians. These feelings were not in vain, however, as mistreatment abounded. Chinese men 
were "forcibly circumcised" by a Sunni Islamist group in Indonesia named the Nahdatul Ulama 
and many Chinese shops were subject to looting.
50
 The Japanese paid special favor to Muslims 
and Buddhists within the Sphere because it was easier to create anti-Western sentiment with 
these groups; however, anti-Western sentiments often did not equate to pro-Japanese feelings.
51
 
Despite the excitement for the Japanese arrival, little "liberation" actually occurred under 
Japanese rule; instead, Indonesians were subjugated to subordinate positions. Liberation did not 
occur because according to the "Principle Governing the Implementation," "existing 
governmental organizations shall be utilized as much as possible."
52
 The Japanese plans for the 
Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere were often more ideological than practical. Therefore, 
instead of adopting a new government with Indonesian nationalist leaders, the Japanese and 
many of the despised Chinese leaders were left in power.
53
 
 Burma is another region where the Japanese unintentionally created a nationalist 
movement. Dr. Ba Maw, who served as the Premier of independent Burma in 1943, speaks in 
high esteem of a Japanese military officer who helped to create this movement and eventual 
independence in Burma. The subject of discussion was Colonel Suzuki Keiji, commonly referred 
to as Bo Mogyo by the Burmese. Suzuki was the leader of the Burmese Independence Army.
54
 
Ba Maw claims that Colonel Suzuki "by his example, stiffened the backs of the Burmese in 
dealing with...Japanese armies.
55
 Suzuki did this by standing up to the Japanese military, often 
outright rebelling against them, in order to gain Burmese independence. Suzuki told Ba Maw 
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"Independence is not the kind of thing you can get through begging for it from other people...the 
Japanese refuse to give it?...proclaim independence and set up your own government."
56
 Though 
the Burmese gained their "independence" in October 1943, the reality is that all "independent" 
nations within the Sphere were more like puppet states.
57
 However, the rebellious nature of Bo 
Mogyo guided the Burmese nationalists in their dealings with the Japanese and European 
colonizers.  
 The Japanese occupation in Malaya also created a rise in nationalism. Professor T.H. 
Silcock and Dr. Ungku Aziz explain that Malayan nationalism was nurtured through learned 
habits of violence under Japanese occupation.
58
 Prior to the war, the Malayans mostly felt that 
their British superiors were friendly. Through propaganda mediums prior to and during the 
GEACOP, Malayans began to view themselves as Asians instead of subjects to British rule. This 
realization led to an "us and them" belief that created anti-European feelings throughout Malaya. 
After the Japanese invasion of Malaya in December 1941, many young leaders rose to the 
occasion to lead their new nation. However, they soon found that Japanese occupation meant 
sitting back as the Japanese led the government with some Malayan puppet leaders. Malayans 
began to resent the Japanese and some even longed for their former British colonizers to save 
them from further Japanese brutality. Later, after the war was over and the British returned, these 
same Malayans resented their British "saviors" who treated them much the same as the 
Japanese.
59
  
 The Japanese occupation of the Philippines had a unique consequence because of Filipino 
exposure to United States democracy and the methods they used to cope with Japanese 
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occupation. One of the main tasks for the Japanese in the Philippines was the removal of the 
political parties in the Philippines. The only political party the Japanese allowed was the 
KALIBAPI, which was a pro-Japanese political party instituted to promote the Greater East Asia 
War. The KALIBAPI was dedicated to the "reconstruction of the Philippines," the "rehab of its 
people," the "promotion of the welfare of the people socially, spiritually, physically, culturally, 
economically," and "to strengthen their adherence to the principles of the Greater East Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere."
60
 The Filipino Director-General of Association of the KALIBAPI was 
Benigno S. Aquino. Aquino was a very successful leader of the organization and promoted the 
Japanese war very well. However, Aquino was merely providing lip service to appease the 
Japanese military in the Philippines. Dr. Teodoro Agoncillo suggests that the "make-believe 
attitude of the [Filipino] people...perhaps saved them...from further Japanese brutalization."
61
 
The Filipino people were so afraid of Japanese treatment they developed consistent lying as a 
deterrent. 
 Perhaps the nation that endured the most abuse from the Japanese was Korea. This 
realization is quite peculiar because some Japanese tend to believe that the Koreans were part of 
the Yamato race, but it seems that biologic race was not as important to the Japanese as national 
identity in race.
62
 Despite racial similarities, and the Japanese attempts to liberate the Koreans 
during the First Sino-Japanese War late in the nineteenth century, Koreans were far behind the 
Japanese in development. By the 1930s, the literacy rate in Korea was about fifteen percent.
63
 
One Japanese colonial administer explained that "the only reason why Korean industry is today 
not greatly flourishing is that the Korean people are on the whole weak and lazy, and lacking the 
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spirit of enterprise."
64
 This quote resembles the racial superiority of many of Japan's colonial 
European counterparts and calls to question what the Japanese considered the Yamato race. 
When Japan annexed Korea in 1910, the first Japanese man to lead the new colony was 
Governor-General Terauchi. Terauchi led Korea with an iron fist and it became a "military 
camp" under "extreme military dictatorship."
65
 In order to force many people into industry, the 
Japanese stripped land rights from Koreans and adopted a system that mirrored that of the 
Highland Clearances of Scotland in that small farming communities were forced to relocate to 
make way for more profitable uses of the land. This was devastating to the Korean populace 
because three quarters of Korean citizens were involved in subsistence farming. This change led 
many Koreans to urban areas for industrial jobs and most of Korea's agribusiness shifted towards 
mechanized agriculture. Regardless of job prospects in the urban areas, the shift from rural to 
urban lifestyle irritated many Koreans. The assimilation process in Korea was more extensive 
than other areas within the Sphere. During the Greater East Asian War, Koreans were "coerced 
into marching to Shinto shrines...to pray for the victory of the Japanese armed forces."
66
 
Eventually, the Japanese prohibited Korean schools to teach the Korean language and instead 
taught only the Japanese language. Because the Koreans shared in the Yamato race, they were 
also heavily used for manpower for the Imperial Japanese Army through conscription. After 
generations of Koreans were educated under Japanese rule, many were loyal to the Japanese and 
even the former nationalists began to bow to Japanese rule or at least "paid lip service" to the 
Japanese cause.
67
 However devastating the treatment of Koreans under Japanese rule, the 
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exposure to industry recreated Korea from a rural and largely uneducated society into a world 
leader in technology today.  
 The belief in Yamato racial supremacy was a key factor in the Japanese expansion, 
colonization, and the development of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. One reason for 
their conviction of racial supremacy is the low number of Japanese suffering from mental 
disorders. The percentage of Japanese diagnosed with mental disorders is about 6%, compared to 
the worldwide average of 20%.
68
 Additionally, military conquests in the first Sino-Japanese war 
and Russo-Japanese War further convinced the Japanese that they were the dominant race in 
Asia and these victories "fanned the release of the virus of racial assertiveness into the Japanese 
ideological bloodstream."
69
 Assured of their racial superiority, the Japanese government began 
eugenics programs.  
 Upon defeat in World War II, Japanese bureaucrats burned incriminating evidence in 
government documents. However, in the 1980s a single copy of a secret document, "An 
Investigation of Global Policy with the Yamato Race as Nucleus," was discovered in a used 
bookstore. The Ministry of Health and Welfare completed this document on 1 July 1943 and it 
was written for only the highest-level bureaucrats in Imperial Japan. While it is generally 
accepted that the GEACOP failed due to shortsightedness and focus on the war, this report 
suggests that the Japanese intention of the Sphere was to dominate other races.
70
 The document 
called for the improvement of the Yamato race both qualitatively and quantitatively. Suggestions 
for qualitative improvement include mental and physical training and selective marriages. 
Quantitatively, the document called for an increase in birth rate, improved medical facilities and 
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insurance, with a target population of 100 million and five children per family.
71
 Mainland Japan 
was overpopulated so expansion was necessary to accommodate the population growth and the 
document detailed such expansion plans. The document outlines the principle of hakkō ichiu or 
eight directions under one roof. In other words, the GEACOP was a stepping-stone to world 
leadership by placing the rest of the world in their "proper place" under Japanese supervision.
72
 
The "Yamato Race as Nucleus" document laid out maps in different stages of their plan with 
much of the world, as distant as North America, under Japanese control. One of the largest goals 
of the Sphere according to the "Yamato Race as Nucleus" document was to ensure that Japanese 
immigrants were in control of the agriculture business wherever they migrated. This is clear as 
the document states "we must plant the 'blood' of the Yamato race in this soil."
73
 The document 
also outlines that these Japanese immigrants were to act as mentors and role models in the host 
country and even forbade any intermingling with other races. They planned to build Japanese 
cultural centers to remind Japanese immigrants of their national identity. This racial supremacy 
conviction is one of the largest reasons the GEACOP failed. Dr. Ba Maw, who generally 
supported the GEACOP, said this about its failures, "Japan was betrayed by her militarists and 
racial fantasies," that the Japanese were "totally incapable...of understanding others," and they 
"saw everything only in a Japanese perspective."
74
 The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere 
failed, despite some of its best intentions, because the Japanese, particularly the military men 
whom the other nations within the Sphere primarily dealt with, were too self-interested and 
convinced of their superiority. 
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Conclusion 
"[F]or Commodore Perry to open Japan was to set in motion a chain of events leading 
inevitably to the invasion of China and the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor less than a century 
later."
75
 
 
 After centuries of operating in a feudal system led by a shogun, Japan was already a 
militaristic society. After the reversal of the "Closed Country Edict of 1635," exposure to 
advanced weaponry aided the Japanese in becoming a world military leader and enabled their 
expansion in Asia. Their use of brutality and failures to adhere to their own policy of kyōson-
kyōei, co-existence and co-prosperity, ended their hopes of leading a pan-Asian society.  
 The Japanese surrendered to the Allied powers in September 1945, long after their 
realization that there was no chance of victory, but they remained diligent on the battlefields until 
the end. The principle of chu, or debt paid to the emperor, was not measured by military victory, 
but through suffering for the emperor in accomplishing his mission.
76
 Despite the extreme 
violence carried out during the Greater East Asia War in the name of the emperor, Allied 
occupation of Japan following the war was relatively peaceful. This is because chu is expected 
no matter the circumstances. The same discipline and sacrifice for the Emperor Shōwa that was 
expected on the battlefield was also expected in defeat. Since that time, Japan has remained a 
world economic leader, particularly in technology. However, there are right-wing groups that 
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support, or at least do not completely condemn, wartime Japan's actions. In August 1999, 
Japanese parliament approved a bill that accepted the rising-sun flag and the anthem of Imperial 
Japan for government ceremonies.
77
  These symbols of Japanese militarism were banned for 
official use since the end of World War II and this reversal caused international distress, 
particularly in South Korea and China, as these symbols have a similar connotation in East Asia 
as the swastika has in the West. These same right-wing groups also emphasize that Japan 
modernized its former colonies and puppet states, and proclaim that Japan helped to end foreign 
colonization in Southeast Asia after the GEACOP. However, it is important to note that the 
inability of Europeans to reclaim their former colonies was not a Japanese intention, but rather 
"an inadvertent result" and the colonies "attained independence by resisting the Japanese" not 
through Japanese assistance.
78
  
 The greatest legacy of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere is the birth of 
nationalism in Southeast Asia. Dr. Ba Maw gave credit to the Japanese for this feat when he said, 
"The phenomenal Japanese victories...really marked the beginning of the end of all imperial 
colonialism."
79
 Despite never gaining pro-Japanese feelings within the Sphere, the Japanese were 
successful in creating anti-Western feelings. Additionally, under Japanese occupation, Southeast 
Asians were also introduced to modern education and centralized governments that further united 
and prepared them to deal with the returning European powers.
80
 Despite these accomplishments 
of Japan's former bloc nations, it is important to understand that throughout the GEACOP, many 
of these occupied nations relentlessly fought the Japanese. This was certainly true in China, 
where the Japanese continued to fight both the CCP and the Kuomintang throughout World War 
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II. In the Philippines, Japanese troops dealt with guerillas, and in Burma, the Burmese 
Independence Army launched attacks against the Japanese.
81
 The Japanese created many 
enemies throughout their Greater East Asia War and maintained few allies.  
 The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was many things to many different people. 
To some, it was an attempt to conquer the "evil" Western powers, to others it was an attempt to 
create a harmonious Asian society. Yet despite these positive intentions, there were also 
intentions to enforce racial supremacy and manipulate others for the development of the 
Japanese people. Regardless of its intentions, the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was 
doomed to fail because of Japan's "inability to link a common cause" with those they were 
supposed to support.
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